If we failed we should stop. On the other hand, if we did succeed we should get into manoeuvre warfare, and the mass of material required for trench warfare would be reduced. As General Officer responsible for the plan he engaged himself that fifteen days should suffice.

Neither Nivelle nor British Ministers were told that, as it turned out, these additional waggons and locomotives were not needed for the *Passchendaele* Nivelle plan, but were required to carry *the red culprit* out the elaborate preparations already being made to stage the tragedy of Passchendaele.

The difficulties created by Haig about taking up more of the line meant delay : discussions about locomotives and waggons were responsible for further delay. There were fresh difficulties in adjusting questions as to the supreme responsibility *Problem of* and direction for the plan of action, and ™*mm*°*/nd* for carrying it out during the course of the battle. Sir Douglas Haig was given the supreme command of the combined British and French troops in the arduous offensive at Passchen-daele. But he and Robertson demurred at the idea of a United Command in the spring offensive. In all, three Conferences had to be held, two in London and one in Calais, before an agreement was reached on these questions.

At the Calais Conference on 26th and syth

February, held in consequence of these disputes days after the time originally fixed for the attack, a compromise was reached which was accepted and signed by both Commanders and also by Generals Lyautey and Robertson on behalf of their respective War Offices,